We consider a system of single-or doubleintegrator agents playing a generalized Nash game over a network, in a partial-information scenario. We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem by designing a fully-distributed dynamic controller, based on continuoustime consensus and primal-dual gradient dynamics. Our main technical contribution is to show convergence of the closed-loop system to a variational equilibrium, under strong monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the game mapping, by leveraging monotonicity properties and stability theory for projected dynamical systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems arise in several network systems, where multiple selfish decisionmakers, or agents, aim at optimizing their individual, yet inter-dependent, objective functions, subject to shared constraints. Engineering applications include demand-side management in the smart grid [1] , charging/discharging of electric vehicles [2] , formation control [3] , communication networks [4] . From a game-theoretic perspective, the aim is to design distributed GNE seeking algorithms, using the local information available to each agent. Moreover, in the cyber-physical systems framework, games are often played by agents with their own dynamics [5] , [6] , and controllers have to be conceived to steer the physical process to a Nash equilibrium, while ensuring closed-loop stability. This stimulates the development of continuous-time schemes [7] , [8] , for which control-theoretic properties are more easily unraveled.
Literature review: A variety of different methods have been proposed to seek GNE in a distributed way [9] , [10] , [11] . These works refers to a full-information setting, where each agent can access the decision of all other agents, for example if a coordinator broadcasts the data to the network. Nevertheless, there are applications where the existence of a central node must be excluded and each agent only relies on the information exchanged over a network, via peer-topeer communication. To deal with this partial-information scenario, payoff-based algorithms for Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking have been studied, [12] , [6] . In this paper, we are instead interested in a different, model-based, approach. We assume that the agents agree on sharing their strategies with their neighbors; each agent keeps an estimate of other agents' action and asymptotically reconstructs the true value, The authors are with the Delft Center for Systems and Control (DCSC), TU Delft, The Netherlands E-mail addresses: {m.bianchi, s.grammatico}@tudelft.nl. This work was partially supported by NWO under research project OMEGA (grant n. 613.001.702) and by the ERC under research project COSMOS (802348). exploiting the information exchanged over the network. This solution has been examined extensively for games without coupling constrains, both in discrete time [13] , [14] , and continuous-time [7] , [15] , [16] . However, fewer works deal with generalized games. Remarkably, Pavel in [17] derived a single-timescale, fixed step sizes GNE learning algorithm, by leveraging an elegant operator splitting approach. The authors in [18] proposed a continuous-time design for aggregative games with equality constraints. All the results mentioned above consider single-integrator agents only. Distributively driving a network of more complex physical systems to game theoretic solutions is still a relatively unexplored problem. With regard to aggregative games, a proportional integral feedback algorithm was developed in [5] to seek a NE in networks of passive nonlinear second-order systems. In [19] , [20] , continuous-time gradient-based controllers were introduced, for some classes of nonlinear systems with uncertainties. The authors of [6] considered generally coupled costs games played by linear time-invariant agents, via a discrete-time extremum seeking approach. NE problems arising in systems of multi-integrator agents, in the presence of deterministic disturbances, were addressed in [21] . In all the references cited, the assumption is made of unconstrained action sets and absence of coupling constraints.
Contribution: Motivated by the above, in this paper we investigate continuous-time GNE seeking for networks of single-or double-integrator agents. We consider games with affine coupling constraints, played under partial-decision information. Specifically:
• We introduce a primal-dual projected-gradient controller for single-integrator agents, which is a continuous-time version of the one proposed in [17] . We show convergence of both primal and dual variables, under strong monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the game mapping, We are not aware of other continuous-time GNE seeking algorithms for games with generally coupled costs, whose convergence is guaranteed under such mild assumptions. With respect to the setup (for aggregative game only) in [18] , we can also handle inequality constraints. • We show how our controller can be adapted to learning GNE in games with shared constraints, played by doubleintegrator agents. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first equilibrium-seeking algorithm for generalized games where the agents have second-order dynamics.
Basic notation: R (R ≥0 ) denotes the set of (nonnegative) real numbers. 0 (1) denotes a matrix/vector with all elements equal to 0 (1); to improve clarity, we may add the dimension of these matrices/vectors as subscript. I n ∈ R n×n denotes the identity matrix of dimension n. For a matrix A ∈ R n×m , its transpose is A ⊤ , [A] i,j represents the element on the row i and column j. A ⊗ B denotes the Kronecker product of the matrices A and B. A ≻ 0 stands for symmetric positive definite matrix. For x, y ∈ R n , let x ⊤ y and x denote the Euclidean inner product and norm respectively. If A is symmetric, λ min (A) := λ 1 (A) ≤ · · · ≤ λ n (A) =: λ max (A) denote its eigenvalues. Given N vectors x 1 , . . . , x N , possibly of different dimensions, x := col (x 1 , . . . , x N ) = [x ⊤ 1 . . . x ⊤ N ] ⊤ , and for each i = 1, . . . , N ,
Operator-theoretic definitions: Given a set S ⊆ R n , letS denote the closure of S. The mapping proj S : R n → S denotes the projection onto a closed convex set S, i.e.,
The set-valued mapping N S : R n ⇒ R n denotes the normal cone operator for the the set S ⊆ R n , i.e.,
denotes the projection on the tangent cone of S at x of a vector v ∈ R n . By Moreau's Decomposition Theorem [22, Th. 6 .30], it holds that v = proj TS (x) (v) + proj NS (x) (v) and proj TS (x) (v) ⊤ proj NS (x) (v) = 0.
Lemma 1: For any closed convex set S ⊆ R q , any y, y ′ ∈ S and any ξ ∈ R q , it holds that
Thus, if Π S (y, ξ) = 0, then (y − y ′ ) ⊤ ξ ≥ 0.
Proof: By Moreau's theorem, (ξ − Π C (y, ξ)) ∈ N S (y), hence for any y, y ′ ∈ C, (y ′ − y) ⊤ (ξ − Π C (y, ξ)) ≤ 0.
II. MATHEMATICAL SETUP
We consider a set of noncooperative agents, I := {1, . . . , N }, where each agent i ∈ I shall choose its decision variable (i.e., strategy) x i from its local decision
∈ Ω denote the stacked vector of all the agents' decisions, Ω = × i∈I Ω i ⊆ R n the overall action space and n := N i=1 n i . Moreover, let x −i = col((x j ) j∈I\{i} ) denote the collective strategy of the all the agents, except that of agent i. The goal of each agent i ∈ I is to minimize its objective function J i (x i , x −i ) which depends on both the local variable x i and on the decision variables of the other agents x −i .
Furthermore, we consider generalized games, where the coupling among the agents arises also via their feasible decision sets. In particular, we consider affine coupling constraints; thus the overall feasible set is
where A := [A 1 , . . . , A N ] and b :=
The game then is represented by the inter-dependent optimization problems:
(2)
In this paper, we consider the problem to compute a GNE, as formalized next.
Next, we postulate standard convexity and regularity assumptions for the constraint sets and cost functions.
Standing Assumption 1 (Regularity and convexity):
For each i ∈ I, the set Ω i is non-empty, closed and convex; X is non-empty and satisfies Slater's constraint qualification; J i is continuously differentiable and the function
Among all the possible GNE, we focus on the impor-
Namely, x * is a v-GNE of the game in (2) if and only if there exist a dual variable λ * ∈ R m such that the following KKT conditions are satisfied [23, Th. 4.8]:
where F is the pseudo-gradient mapping of the game:
A sufficient condition for the existence of a unique v-GNE for the game in (2) Standing Assumption 2: The pseudo-gradient mapping in (4) is strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous: for any pair
III. DISTRIBUTED GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM

SEEKING
In this section, we consider the game in (2), where each agent is associated with a dynamical system:
Our aim is to design the inputs u i to seek a v-GNE in a fully distributed way. Specifically, agent i does not have full knowledge of x −i , and only relies on the information exchanged locally with neighbors over a communication network G(I, E), with weighted symmetric Laplacian L ∈ R N ×N . The unordered pair (i, j) belongs to the set of edges, E, if and only if agent j and i can exchange information.
Standing Assumption 3: The communication graph G(I, E) is undirected and connected.
Algorithm 1 Distributed GNE seekinġ
The algorithm we propose is a continuous-time version of [17, Alg. 1]. To cope with partial-decision information, each agent keeps an estimate of all other agents' action. We denote
≥0 of the Lagrangian multiplier and an auxiliary variable z i ∈ R m to allow for distributed consensus of the multiplier estimates.
Our proposed closed-loop dynamics are shown in Algorithm 1, where c > 0 is a global constant parameter, W = [w ij ] ∈ R N ×N is the weighted adjacency matrix of the graph G, N i is the set of neighbors of agent i and
We note that agents exchange {x i , z i , λ i } with their neighbors only, therefore the controller can be implemented distributedly. In steady state, agents should agree on their estimates, i.e., x i = x j , λ i = λ j , for all i, j ∈ I. This motivates the presence of consensual terms for both the primal and dual variables. We denote E q := {y ∈ R N q : y = 1 N ⊗ y, y ∈ R q } the consensual subspace of dimension q, for some q > 0, and E ⊥ q its orthogonal complement. Specifically, E n is the estimate consensus subspace and E m is the multiplier consensus subspace. To write the system (5) under Algorithm 1 in compact form, let us define, as in [17, , for all i ∈ I,
where n <i = j<i,j∈I n j , n >i = j>i,j∈I n j . We note that R i selects the i-th n i dimensional component from an ndimensional vector, while S i removes it. Thus,
, L x := L ⊗ I n , L λ := L ⊗ I m , z := col ((z i ) i∈I ). Furthermore, we define the extended pseudo-gradient mapping F as:
The overall closed-loop system, in compact form, reads as:
The following Lemma relates the equilibria of the system in (8) to the v-GNE of the game in (2) . The proof is analogous to [17, Th. 1], hence it is omitted.
Lemma 2:
The following statements hold: i) Any equilibrium pointω = col x,z,λ of the dynamics in (8) 
where the pair (x * , λ * ) satisfies the KKT conditions in (3), hence x * is a v-GNE. ii) The set of equilibrium points of (8) is nonempty.
Remark 1: When considering Algorithm 1 in absence of coupling constraints, we retrieve the controller in [7, Eq. 47 ]. We remark that, in Algorithm 1, each agent evaluates the gradient of its cost function in its local estimate, not on the actual collective strategy. In fact, only when the estimates belong to the consensus subspace, i.e., x = 1 ⊗ x (in the case of full-information, for example), we have that F (x) = F (x). It follows that the operator R ⊤ F is not necessarily monotone, not even if the pseudo gradient F in (4) is strongly monotone, i.e., Standing Assumption 2.
While cocoercivity of the extended pseudo-gradient (on the augmented estimate space) is sometimes postulated in NE problems under partial-information [13] , [15] , we will make use of a weaker condition, namely Lipschitz continuity.
Lemma 3:
The extended pseudo-gradient mapping F in (7) is Lipschitz continuous: for any pair x, y ∈ R N n , F (x) − F (y) ≤ θ x − y , for some µ ≤ θ ≤ θ 0 .
Proof: See Appendix VI-A.
Under Lipschitz continuity of the extended pseudogradient, [17] showed the following result, which is crucial to prove convergence of the dynamics in (8) .
Lemma 4 ([17, Lem. 3]): Let
For any c > c, for any x and any x ′ ∈ E n , it holds that M ≻ 0 and that
Leveraging the restricted strong monotonicity property stated in the previous Lemma, we show the main result of this section, i.e., the convergence of dynamics in (8) to a v-GNE.
Theorem 1: Let c > c, with c as in (9) , and let Ω := {x ∈ R N n | Rx ∈ Ω}. For any initial condition in Ξ = Ω × R mN ×R mN ≥0 , the dynamics in (8) have a unique Carathodory solution, which belongs to Ξ for all t ≥ 0. The solution converges to an equilibrium col x,z,λ , withx = 1 N ⊗x * , λ = 1 N ⊗ λ * , where the pair (x * , λ * ) satisfies the KKT conditions in (3), hence x * is a v-GNE for the game in (2) .
Proof: See Appendix VI-B.
IV. DISTRIBUTED GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM
SEEKING FOR DOUBLE-INTEGRATOR AGENTS
In this section, we consider a game as in (2) Moreover, we model each agent as a double integrator:
We emphasize that in (10) we cannot directly control the agent strategy x i . Our objective is to drive each agent action (i.e., the x i coordinates of each agent state (x i , v i )) to a v-GNE. Moreover, at steady state, the velocities of all the agents must be zero. This scenario has been considered recently in [21] , for games without coupling constraints.
In (10), we consider the controller u i = 1 hi (ũ i −v i ), wherẽ u i has to be chosen appropriately; moreover, as in [21] , let us define the coordinates transformation
Here h i > 0 are positive steps, for all i ∈ I. The quantity ζ i can be interpreted as a prediction of the position of agent i given a forward step h i . The closed-loop system in the new coordinates then reads as
We note that the dynamics of the variable ζ i in (12b), under Assumption 1, are identical to the single-integrator in (5) , with translated inputũ i . As such, we are are able to design the inputũ i , according to Algorithm 1, to drive ζ := col((ζ i ) i∈I ) to an equilibriumζ = x * , where x * is the v-GNE for the game in (2) . Moreover, the velocity dynamics (12a) are Input-to-state-stable (ISS) with respect to the input u i [25, Lemma 4.6] . Finally, we remark that, at any equilibrium of (10), v i = 0 ni , hence ζ i = x i , for all i ∈ I. Building on this considerations, we propose Algorithm 2 to drive the double-integrator agents (10) towards a v-GNE.
Differently from Algorithm 1, the agents are not keeping an estimate of other agents action, but of other agents prediction. Here, ζ i = col((ζ i j ) j∈I ), and ζ i j represents agent i's estimation of the quantity ζ j = x j + h j v j for j = i , while ζ i i := x i + h i v i = ζ i . In compact form, the closed-Algorithm 2 Distributed GNE seeking (double-integrators)
Theorem 2: Let Assumption 1 hold. For any initial condition with λ(0) ∈ R mN ≥0 , the equations in (13) have a unique Carathodory solution, such that λ(t) ∈ R N m ≥0 , for all t ≥ 0. The solution converges to an equilibrium col x,v,ζ,z,λ , withx = x * ,v = 0 n ,ζ = 1 N ⊗ x * ,λ = 1 N ⊗ λ * , where the pair (x * , λ * ) satisfies the KKT conditions in (3), so x * is a v-GNE for the game in (2) .
Proof: See Appendix VI-C.
We note that Algorithm 2 is derived by choosingũ i in (12) according to Algorithm 1. The proof of Theorem 2 is not based on the specific structure of Algorithm 1, but only on its convergence properties. Hence the result still holds if another controller with similar features is selected in place of Algorithm 1. In [21] , the authors addressed NE problems and chose the inputsũ i according to the algorithm presented in [7, Eq. 47 ]. The controller in [7] achieves exponential convergence to a NE, hence ISS with respect to possible additive disturbances [25, Lemma 4.6] . Therefore, in [21] , the authors were able to tackle the presence of deterministic disturbances, via an asymptotic observer and by leveraging ISS arguments. We have not guaranteed this robustness, i.e., exponential convergence, for the primal-dual dynamics in (8) . However, the controller in [21] is designed for games without any constraints (local or shared). On the contrary, the controller in Algorithm 2 drives the system in (10) to a v-GNE of a generalized game, and ensures for the coupling constraints to be satisfied asymptotically. We also remark that, like in [21] , we assumed the absence of constraints on the local feasible set of each agent (Assumption 1). Nevertheless, if some are present, they can be included in the coupling constraints. 
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: MOBILE SENSOR NETWORK
We consider a group of five robots moving in a plane as in [21] . Each agent i ∈ I = {1, . . . , 5} has a cost function
with p i = col(x i , y i ) its cartesian coordinates, r 1 = col(2, −2), r 2 = col(−2, −2), r 3 = col(−4, 2), r 4 = col(2, −4), r 5 = col (3, 3) . The robots can communicate over a randomly generated connected graph G(I, E). We assume the local constraints 0.1 ≤ y i ≤ 0.5, ∀i ∈ I. In order for all the robots to maintain communication with their neighbors, we impose the Chebyschev distance between any two neighboring robots to be smaller than 0.2 m. Hence the (affine) coupling constraints are represented by max{|x i − x j |, |y i − y j |} ≤ 0.2, ∀(i, j) ∈ E.
Velocity-actuated robots: each agent is modeled as in (5) and we apply Algorithm 1.
Force-actuated robots : Each agent has a dynamic as in (10) , under Algorithm 2. The local constraints are considered as part of the coupling constraints, hence are dualized and will be satisfied asymptotically (see Section IV).
The initial conditions are chosen randomly and we fix c = 30 to satisfy the condition in Theorem 1. Figure 1 illustrates the results for the two cases and shows convergence the GNE of the game and asymptotic satisfaction of the coupling constraints. Finally, in Figure 2 , we compare the trajectories of the five robots in the velocity-actuated and force-actuated scenario. In the two cases, the agents are converging to the same, unique v-GNE. However, the local constraints are satisfied along the whole trajectory for single integrator agents, only asymptotically for the double integrator agents.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Generalized games played by double-integrator agents can be solved via a fully distributed primal-dual projectedpseudogradient dynamic controller, if the game mapping is strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous. Seeking an equilibrium in games with compact action sets or constrained dynamics is currently an unexplored problem. The extension of our results to networks of heterogeneous dynamical systems is left as future research.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3
Let us define x = col((x i ) i∈I ), y = col((y i ) i∈I ). By Standing Assumption 2, we have, for all i ∈ I,
as it is clear by choosing x j = y j for all j = i. Therefore it holds that
Then θ ≥ µ follows by choosing Sx = Sy, x = y.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Under Standing Assumption 3, we have, for any q > 0,
We first rewrite the dynamics aṡ
where ω = col (x, z, λ),
B is Lipschitz continuous by Standing Assumption 2 and Ξ is closed and convex by Standing Assumption 1. We conclude that that there exists a unique Carathodory solution to (15) , that belongs to Ξ for every t ≥ 0, [26, Th. 2.5]. Consider the quadratic Lyapunov function
whereω := col(x,z,λ) is any equilibrium of (8) . We remark that, by Lemma 2, an equilibrium exists, andx = 1 N ⊗ x * ,λ = 1 N ⊗ λ * , with (x * , λ * ) satisfying the KKT conditions in (3) . We can apply Lemma 1 to obtaiṅ
By Lemma 1, it also holds that (ω−ω) ⊤ (−B(ω)−Φω) ≤ 0. By subtracting this term from (16), we obtaiṅ
where, in the last equality, we used that, Φ ⊤ = −Φ. By (14) and [22, Cor. 18.16] , we have that
with M ≻ 0 as in (9) . By noticing that V is radially unbounded, we conclude that the solution to (8) We first characterize any point col(x,ẑ,λ) ∈ Z, for which the quantities in (16)-(18) must be zero. By (18) 
≥0 . Also, by expanding (16) , and by using thatx =x, L λλ = 0, we have
where in the second equality we have used (14) and the fourth equality follows from the KKT conditions in (3). This concludes the characterization of the set Z. By invariance, any trajectory ω(t) = col(x(t), z(t), λ(t)) starting at any col(x, z, λ) ∈ O must lie in Z ⊃ O for all t ≥ 0. Therefore, x(t) ≡x and λ(t) ∈ E m for all t. Moreover,ż(t) = 0, for all t, by (8b), or z(t) ≡ z. Hence the quantity v := (ΛRx(t) − b−L λ λ(t) − L λ z(t)) is constant along the trajectory ω. Suppose by contradiction that v k > 0, where v k denotes the k-th component of v. Then, by (8c), λ(t) k = v k for all t, and λ(t) grows indefinitely. Since all the solutions of (8) are bounded, this is a contradiction. Therefore, v ≤ 0, and λ(t) ⊤ v = 0 by (19) . Equivalently, v ∈ N R N m ≥0 (λ(t)), henceλ(t) = 0, for all t. We conclude that all the points in the set O are equilibria.
The set Λ(ω 0 ) of ω-limit points 1 of the solution to (8) starting from any ω 0 ∈ Ξ is nonempty (by Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, since all the trajectories of (8) are bounded) and invariant (as in proof of [16, Lemma 5] ). ByV ≤ 0 it follows that V must be constant on Λ(ω 0 ), hence Λ(ω 0 ) ⊆ Z (see proof of [16, Th.2] ). Also Λ(ω 0 ) is invariant, so Λ(ω 0 ) ⊆ O. Since the distance to any equilibrium point along any trajectory of (8) is non-increasing by (18) , it follows that if a solution of (8) has an ω-limit point at an equilibrium, then the solution converges to that equilibrium. The last claim follows by Lemma 2.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
By applying the coordinate transformation x → Rζ = x + Hv, we obtain:
The system (20) is in cascade form for (20a) with respect to (20b)-(20d). Notice also that, under Assumption 1, the subsystem (20b)-(20d) is exactly (8) . Hence, there exists a unique solution to (20b)-(20d), that is bounded and converges to an equilibrium point col ζ ,k,z,λ , withζ = 1 N ⊗ x * ,λ = 1 N ⊗ λ * , where the pair (x * , λ * ) satisfies the KKT conditions in (3), by Theorem 1. On the other hand, the dynamic (20a) is ISS with respect to the input u := −H −1 (F (ζ) + Λ ⊤ λ + cRL x ζ) [25, Lemma 4.6] , and this input is bounded, by boundedness of the trajectory (ζ, k, z, λ) and Lemma 3. Moreover, sinceζ = 1 N ⊗ x * , λ = 1 N ⊗λ * , by the KKT conditions in (3) and by continuity, we haveũ → 0 n for t → ∞. Therefore, v(t) → 0 n for t → ∞ (this follows from definition of ISS, see [25, Ex. 4.58] ). By definition of ζ i = R i ζ i in (11), we can also conclude that x → x * .
